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UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE REEL WORLD 
Jake Linford* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Larry Cunningham’s new book, Contracts in the Real 
World,1 demonstrates that there is much to learn about contract law from 
a few well-chosen stories. The goal of this Essay is to provide a similar 
service, relying on stories gleaned from movies and television—
contracts in the “reel world,” so to speak—to illustrate and then 
undermine the traditional stories told about contract formation and 
modification. We can learn much from the scenes discussed herein about 
how consumers might be led to think contracts are formed, and perhaps 
misled about the certainty contracts provide. 
Contract law, as it has been classically described, should provide a 
stable system for the exchange of property between willing parties, a 
concept often referred to as “private ordering.”2 When stable rules 
regarding the enforceability of promises made in arm’s length 
transactions are supported by the state, a framework exists in which 
parties can have confidence in the deal struck, and plan for the future in 
accordance with that deal. Unfortunately, this traditional notion of 
private ordering as a bilateral process is, in many cases, mythological. 
The reel world—the world of cinema and television—has perpetuated 
this idea that contracts are negotiated; that there is a give and take that is 
simply not present in the real world, at least for consumer contracts. 
Hollywood aside, most contracts are one-sided boilerplate affairs with 
terms that consumers can take or leave, but not negotiate or change. 
Furthermore, many of these contracts now include unilateral reordering 
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Larry Cunningham and 
the editors of the Washington Law Review for this opportunity, to Shawn Bayern, Murat Mungan, 
Karen Sandrik, Mark Spottswood, and Franita Tolson for insightful discussions and incisive 
comments, and to Evan Liebovitz for excellent research assistance. Remaining mistakes are mine 
alone. 
1. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR 
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012). 
2. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 34 (2013).  
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clauses that empower the drafter to change the terms as it sees fit.3 
This boilerplate world is not all bad. Some sellers transact with 
hundreds of thousands of consumers—if not millions—in a given year. 
Thus, there are situations when it is most efficient to allow sellers to use 
fixed terms, which provide for uniform transactions. In addition, fixed 
terms that limit liability or otherwise reduce costs may result in savings 
that can be passed on to consumers.4 Nevertheless, there is something 
particularly troubling—and I argue inefficient—about a deal that 
continually changes. 
Part I sets the stage by briefly describing how the representations of 
contracting in the reel world generally perpetuate a classical concept of 
contract formation. Part II explains some of the differences between 
perception and reality, particularly when it comes to boilerplate terms 
festooned with unilateral reordering clauses, and offers different 
archetypes from the reel world that better reflect modern contract 
formation and modification. Part III questions the efficiency rationale 
underlying apologies for boilerplate, explains how that rationale is even 
weaker when used to justify the enforceability of unilateral reordering 
clauses, and proposes solutions stemming from that analysis. 
I. THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION 
AND MODIFICATION 
Negotiation: the essence of capitalism! 
—Jack Donaghy, 30 Rock.5 
 
Contract law, in its classic form, is founded on the concept of a 
bargained-for exchange. This classic conception of bargains struck at 
arm’s length by parties wringing concessions from one another also led 
to a static notion of the contract, one that cannot be modified unless the 
party seeking the change gives something in exchange. Many 
representations of negotiation in the reel world dovetail with this classic 
conception of contract law. 
3. In light of the use of unilateral reordering provisions, Curtis Bridgeman and Karen Sandrik 
conclude that many promises made by sellers to consumers are “bullshit promises,” allowing the 
seller to take advantage of promissory language without being subject to sanctions for changing its 
mind. See generally Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379 
(2009). 
4. See infra Part III.  
5. 30 Rock: Hard Ball (NBC Universal television broadcast Feb. 22, 2007). 
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A. Representations of Negotiation in the Reel World 
When consumers think about contract negotiations, they might 
imagine something like the following scene from Network, a satirical 
film about television networks, in which the titular network is trying to 
negotiate a deal with a band of radical terrorists (modeled on the 
Symbionese Liberation Army) to co-host a program called the Mao-Tse 
Tung Hour.6 Laureen Hobbs is a self-described “bad-ass commie” trying 
to control how big a cut the terrorists can take of the program, including 
sublicensing fees and distribution costs. Helen Miggs and Willie Stein 
represent the network. The Great Ahmed Khan leads the terrorist group, 
and Mary Ann Gifford is one of his most ardent devotees. As the 
narrator intones, the parties endeavor to work through “the usual 
contractual difficulties”: 
Helen Miggs: [flipping through her copy of the contract] Have 
we settled that sub-licensing thing? We want a clear definition 
here. Gross proceeds should consist of all funds the sublicensee 
receives, not merely the net amount remitted after payment to 
sublicensee or distributor. 
Willie Stein: We’re not sitting still for overhead charges as a 
cost prior to distribution. 
Laureen Hobbs: Don’t fuck with my distribution costs! I’m 
getting a lousy two-fifteen per segment, and I’m already 
deficiting twenty-five grand a week with Metro. I’m paying 
William Morris ten percent off the top! And I’m giving this 
turkey [indicates Khan] ten thou a segment, and another five for 
this fruitcake [indicates Gifford]. And, Helen, don’t start no shit 
with me about a piece again! I’m paying Metro twenty percent 
of all foreign and Canadian distribution, and that’s after 
recoupment! The Communist Party’s not going to see a nickel 
out of this goddamn show until we go into syndication! 
Miggs: Come on, Laureen, you’ve got the party in there for 
seventy-five hundred a week production expenses. 
Hobbs: I’m not giving this pseudo-insurrectionary sectarian a 
piece of my show! I’m not giving him script approval! And I 
sure as shit ain’t cutting him in on my distribution charges. 
Mary Ann Gifford: [screaming] You fuckin’ fascist! Have you 
6. NETWORK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976). Those who favor more modern fare might prefer 
any of a number of scenes from Entourage featuring the inimitable Ari Gold. See, e.g., Entourage: 
Scared Straight (HBO television broadcast Sept. 27, 2009); Entourage: Give a Little Bit (HBO 
television broadcast Oct. 4, 2009). 
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seen the movies we took at the San Marino jail break-out, 
demonstrating the rising up of a seminal prisoner-class 
infrastructure? 
Hobbs: You can blow the seminal prisoner-class infrastructure 
out your ass! I’m not knocking down my goddamn distribution 
charges! 
[The Great Ahmed Khan fires a pistol into the air.] 
Khan: Man, give her the fucking overhead clause! Let’s get 
back to page twenty-two, number 5, small ‘a’. “Subsidiary 
rights.”7 
In the Network excerpt, parties hold hard lines, drive hard bargains, 
use colorful language, and find dramatic ways to punctuate points. 
Savvy businessmen and experienced lawyers roll up their sleeves and go 
to work until the deal is done. One can imagine nights full of give and 
take, crafting the dickered terms to ensure that the parties get a deal that 
each side can live with, if not love. But each party can be understood to 
get something from the other party—and likely give something up as 
well. 
There may have been a point in history when this was the typical 
manner in which contracts were formed, but those days are long past.8 
Most contracts entered into by consumers are one-sided affairs, often 
called “contracts of adhesion,” due in part to the stickiness, or 
inescapability, of the terms.9 The terms within are often referred to as 
“boilerplate,” because they cannot be changed or negotiated.10 And 
when a consumer tries to understand a modern contract, laden with 
boilerplate terms, she might imagine the scene from A Night at the 
Opera,11 where characters played by Groucho and Chico Marx simply 
tear from the page those terms they do not understand: 
Driftwood: All right. It says the, uh, “The first part of the party 
7. NETWORK, supra note 6. 
8. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in 
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”) (citation omitted). 
9. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
10. As Professor Radin has noted: 
The term [boilerplate] dates back to the early 1900s and refers to the thick, tough steel sheets 
used to build steam boilers. From the 1890s onward, printing plates of text for widespread 
reproduction, such as advertisements or syndicated columns, were cast or stamped in 
steel . . . . Some companies also sent out press releases as boilerplate so that they had to be 
printed as written. 
RADIN, supra note 2, at xvi n.* (quoting Wikipedia). 
11. A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1935). 
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of the first part shall be known in this contract as the first part of 
the party of the first part shall be known in this contract”—look, 
why should we quarrel about a thing like this? We’ll take it right 
out, eh? 
Fiorello: Yeah, it’s too long, anyhow. [Both tear off the top part 
of their respective contracts] Now, what do we got left? 
Driftwood: Well, I got about a foot and a half. Now, it says, uh, 
“The party of the second part shall be known in this contract as 
the party of the second part.” 
Fiorello: Well, I don’t know about that . . . . 
Driftwood: Now what’s the matter? 
Fiorello: I no like the second party, either. 
Driftwood: Well, you should’ve come to the first party. We 
didn’t get home ‘til around four in the morning . . .  I was blind 
for three days! 
Fiorello: Hey, look, why can’t the first part of the second party 
be the second part of the first party? Then you got something. 
Driftwood: Well, look, uh, rather than go through all that again, 
what do you say? 
Fiorello: Fine. [They rip out another portion of the contract]12 
Of course, there are times when a consumer reads a contract, even in 
light of some potentially problematic terms, and signs it anyway. For 
example, in The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey,13 Bilbo Baggins, the 
titular hobbit, is presented with a lengthy contract identifying the terms 
under which he is to provide services as a burglar. Bilbo takes the time 
to read, and eventually sign the contract, even though it includes some 
potentially troubling clauses: 14 
12. Id.  
13. THE HOBBIT: AN UNEXPECTED JOURNEY (New Line Cinema, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Pictures & WingNut Films 2012). 
14. The contract also included a unilateral reordering clause: “I, the undersigned, [referred to 
hereinafter as Burglar,] agree to travel to the Lonely Mountain, path to be determined by Thorin 
Oakenshield, who has a right to alter the course of the journey at his so choosing, without prior 
notification and/or liability for accident or injury incurred.” See James Daily, Read a Lawyer’s 
Amazingly Detailed Analysis of Bilbo’s Contract in The Hobbit, WIRED.COM (Jan. 17, 2013, 4:17 
PM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2013/01/hobbit-contract-legal-analysis/. For those 
unfamiliar with The Hobbit, Thorin Oakenshield is the leader of the dwarves that employ Bilbo 
Baggins. 
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Bilbo: [reading aloud] The present company shall  
not be liable for injuries inflicted by or sustained as a 
consequence thereof, including, but not limited 
to . . . lacerations . . . evisceration . . . incineration?15 
Both Bilbo’s decision to read a contract from start to finish, and the 
hard bargaining in a movie like Network, are consistent with a traditional 
view of contract formation: parties dicker at arm’s length, carefully 
negotiating terms. Under that traditional view, each party gains some 
ground and makes some concessions, and each party enters the contract 
fully informed about the obligations they have undertaken. 
As the excerpts discussed above also demonstrate, the reel world 
teaches us that it matters whether things are written down. The parties in 
Network were hard at work amending the same type of densely written 
contractual language through which Bilbo waded so persistently. But the 
certainty of a written contract can be deceptive. There is a perception 
that contract formalities and contract language can trip up the unwary. In 
It’s the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown,16 the tripping—or at least the 
subsequent fall—is portrayed literally. 
You may remember the scene where Lucy tries to entice Charlie 
Brown to kick a football she is holding. He is wise to her, and 
refuses . . . at first: 
Charlie Brown: You just want me to come running up to kick 
that ball so you can pull it away and see me land flat on my back 
and kill myself. 
Lucy: This time you can trust me. See? Here’s a signed 
document testifying that I promise not to pull it away. 
Charlie Brown: It is signed. It’s a signed document. I guess if 
you have a signed document in your possession, you can’t go 
wrong. This year, I’m really going to kick that football. [Charlie 
Brown runs toward the football, which Lucy pulls away at the 
last second] Aaaaahh! [The document goes flying as Charlie 
Brown lands flat on his back] 
Lucy: [catching the document as it flutters to earth] Peculiar 
thing about this document. It was never notarized.17 
 The lesson here is two-fold: First, you can go wrong, even with a 
signed document in your possession. Second, even a signed document 
15. THE HOBBIT: AN UNEXPECTED JOURNEY, supra note 13.  
16. Charlie Brown: It’s the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown (Lee Mendelson Film Productions 
television broadcast Oct. 27, 1966). 
17. Id.  
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may not be as enforceable as it appears. While formalities like 
notarization are not required to make a contract enforceable (indeed, an 
oral contract is enforceable in most circumstances),18 there is something 
comforting about the formalities. With Lucy’s deception of the hapless 
Charlie Brown as the deviant outlier, these scenes from the reel world 
portray parties committed to getting contract terms right, or at least 
understanding them, with the idea that they would be bound to meet the 
terms or pay the consequences once the deal was finalized. 
Those who have survived a first-year course in contract law know that 
there was a time when a formalized, written document bearing a wax 
seal was the sine qua non of enforceability.19 Seals were helpful as a 
formality because they performed three key functions.20 The seal was 
formal evidence that the contract exists, or was formed. Heating wax to 
apply the seal to a document performed a cautionary function, requiring 
the parties to slow down, at least for a moment, and consider whether 
they truly wanted to make the commitments embodied in the sealed 
document.21 Finally, the document under seal channels the attention of 
the courts and parties after the fact.22 Those commitments made under 
seal were thus commitments the parties likely intended a court to 
enforce.23 
The power of a seal as a formality was diluted over time,24 and courts 
replaced it with the formality of consideration, also known as a 
bargained-for exchange. Contracts are thus enforceable, consistent with 
the doctrine of consideration, when the parties have each agreed to the 
exchange, with each either giving something up or promising something 
to the other party.25 Thinking back to the example from Network, one 
can imagine, if not for lack of time, there would be multiple examples in 
the film of the terrorist organization receiving concessions as well as 
making them. In the same vein, the problem with Lucy’s promise to 
Charlie Brown was not that it lacked notarization, but that it lacked 
18. But see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 141–47 (describing cases dealing with the statute of 
frauds and the types of contracts that require a writing). 
19. Id. at 12–13, 34, 219 n.4. 
20. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1941). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 801 (“[F]orm offers . . . [are] channels for the legally effective expression of 
intention.”). 
24. See, e.g., Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Divine, 116 A. 239 (Conn. 1922) (citing 
1 SWIFT’S DIG. 174 (1822 ed.)). 
25. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 13; Fuller, supra note 20, at 814–15. 
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consideration.26 
Consideration is primarily at issue when a contract is initially formed, 
and like the formality of the seal, the formality of consideration 
ostensibly performs similar evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling 
functions.27 In a world where bargained-for exchange is the norm, one 
expects every contract to be formed in an arm’s length negotiation, and 
parties to stick to the deal negotiated. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
consideration was seen as an important signal to aid in determining 
whether a subsequent agreement to modify a contract was also 
enforceable. 
B. Classic Contract Modification in the Real World 
As discussed above, contracts are generally enforceable when there is 
consideration—mutual benefits received or given by each party. 
Contracts can also be modified when the need presents itself. For that 
modification to be enforceable, however, courts historically looked for 
fresh consideration to support the new terms requested by the party 
seeking the modification.28 In other words, the party subject to the 
modified deal should get something in the exchange. Without such 
consideration, the newly modified terms were held unenforceable. 
Some of the earliest attempts to fix the boundaries of contract 
modification are found in two English cases decided at the turn of the 
nineteenth century: Harris v. Watson,29 and Stilk v. Myrick.30 Harris and 
Stilk both dealt with promises made to sailors that the court found 
unenforceable. In both cases, the captain of a ship agreed to pay extra 
wages to sailors in different exigent circumstances. In Harris, a sailing 
ship encountered trouble at sea, and the captain, Watson, promised to 
26. There are some general exceptions to the consideration requirement, like the possibility of a 
contract formed due to the reasonable reliance of one party on otherwise unenforceable promises by 
the other. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 7, 16. Perhaps one could find that poor Chuck 
relied to his detriment on Lucy’s promise in a way that makes the promise enforceable. Given their 
history, however, it is hard to characterize that reliance as reasonable. 
27. See Fuller, supra note 20, at 800; cf. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle 
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 103–04 
(2000). 
28. See, e.g., Thurston v. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 9 (Ohio 1856) (“[A] verbal agreement, to be 
effectual and binding as an alteration of the express terms of a prior written contract between the 
parties, must be supported by a new and valid consideration.”). 
29. (1791) 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (N.P.); 1 P.N.P. 102. 
30. (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 851 (N.P.); 6 Esp. 129–30. As discussed, below, two different reports 
provided significantly different takes on the rationale supporting the decision in Stilk. See infra 
notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 
                                                     
12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:14 PM 
2013] UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE REEL WORLD 1403 
pay five guineas extra if Harris should take on additional navigating 
duties.31 When the ship arrived safely, Harris was not given his extra 
pay.32 Lord Kenyon nonsuited Harris, invoking a maritime policy 
against paying extra wages promised in such exigent circumstances.33 
Lord Kenyon expressed concern that sailors would “in many cases suffer 
a ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand 
they might think proper to make.”34 
Leaving aside the believability of a sailor willing to go down with the 
ship, rather than do a bit of extra work without extra pay, one can 
understand the policy intuitions here. Economic growth in Great Britain 
in the eighteenth century depended in large part on transoceanic 
commerce.35 Honoring contracts renegotiated in dangerous 
circumstances could encourage negotiating in dangerous circumstances, 
and drive up prices for shipped goods, whether or not more ships were 
lost at sea as a result of contract disputes gone wrong. There is also some 
reason to suppose a captain in such difficult situations might literally say 
anything to save his life and his ship, and that contract modifications 
entered into in such a circumstance could not be entered into 
intentionally or consensually. 
In Stilk v. Myrick,36 two sailors abandoned their ship at the midpoint 
in a voyage to Russia. The captain tried and failed to hire two new 
crewmen, so he promised to divide their wages among the remaining 
men to limp the ship back to London.37 Stilk was thus distinguishable 
from Harris on policy grounds, although Lord Ellenborough did not so 
distinguish it.38 In the more complete of two reports, John Campbell 
recounts that Lord Ellenborough based the decision to nonsuit the 
sailors’ claim on a lack of consideration between captain and crew for 
31. Harris, 170 Eng. Rep. at 94. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. (citing Hernaman v. Bawden, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1129 (N.P.), 3 Burr. 1844 (holding that 
until the ship’s cargo was delivered, wages were not due the sailors, leaving sailors to bear the risk 
of loss of cargo); Abernethy v. Landale, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 342 (N.P.), 2 Doug. 539 (same, even 
though the plaintiff was not on the ship at the time of capture)); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT 27–28 (1974). 
34. Harris, 170 Eng. Rep. at 94. 
35. See generally Jacob M. Price, What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas 
Trade, 1660–1790, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 267 (1989). 
36. (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 851 (N.P.); 6 Esp. 129–30. 
37. Id.  
38. In a report by Isaac Espinasse, id. at 128, Lord Ellenborough is portrayed as persuaded that 
Lord Kenyon’s policy analysis in Harris was equally applicable to the case of Stilk. This is 
somewhat hard to follow, as there was not the same state of emergency in Stilk as in Harris, 
although the captain of the ship in Stilk was admittedly in a tight spot. 
 
                                                     
12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:14 PM 
1404 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1395 
the modification to the deal.39 
In Stilk, consideration was used not to cabin the initial formation of a 
contract, but to determine whether or not a subsequent modification to 
the contract was enforceable. We also see in Harris, expressly, and Stilk, 
less forcefully, stirrings of a general concept of duress.  
The more modern case of Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico40 
raises some of the same concerns. In Alaska Packers, fishermen hired in 
San Francisco threatened, on arrival in Alaska, not to fish during the 
salmon spawning season unless they were paid extra wages. The 
employer acquiesced, as the hold-out jeopardized its salmon packing 
venture for the entire year. The Ninth Circuit held that the modification 
was unenforceable, because the work the fishermen promised to do was 
within the scope of the initial contract.41 The same principle has applied 
in cases where an architect refused to perform until he received a cut of a 
competitor’s deal with the client,42 and when a supplier refused to 
provide promised components for radar equipment to a naval contractor 
unless the contractor paid extra and used the supplier for its next contract 
with the Navy.43 While there are exceptions to this relatively broad 
understanding about the insufficiency of pre-existing duties to provide 
consideration for modifications,44 courts continue to invoke the 
principle,45 to the dismay of some scholars.46 This classical notion of 
contract formation and modification has nevertheless shifted to a 
considerable extent, as we consider in the next Part. 
39. Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168–69 (N.P.); 2 Camp. N. P. 317–22. 
40. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1902); CUNNINGHAM, supra 
note 1, at 161–62. 
41. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 117 F. at 102 (“Consent to such a demand, under such circumstances, 
if given, was, in our opinion, without consideration, for the reason that it was based solely upon the 
[fishermen’s] agreement to render the exact services, and none other, that they were already under 
contract to render.”). 
42. As noted in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co.: 
[W]hen a party merely does what he has already obligated himself to do, he cannot demand an 
additional compensation therefor; and although, by taking advantage of the necessities of his 
adversary, he obtains a promise for more, the law will regard it as nudum pactum [a bare, 
unenforceable promise], and will not lend its process to aid in the wrong. 
15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1890). 
43. See Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 534, 537 (N.Y. 1971). 
44. For example, courts have held that the discovery of unforeseen conditions can justify an 
enforceable modification, so long as neither party could have anticipated the condition and the 
payor agreed to provide extra compensation for the payee’s “extra” work. See, e.g., Brian Constr. & 
Dev. Co. v. Brighetti, 176 Conn. 162, 405 A.2d 72 (1978); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 160. 
45. See, e.g., Laidman v. Clark, No. 2:11-CV-00704-LRH-PAL, 2013 WL 508169, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Feb. 8, 2013). 
46. See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 65, 70 (2012). 
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II. UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
The classical notion of contract law, and representations thereof from 
the reel world, suggest that deals are negotiated, as are modifications. 
This notion that parties are empowered to negotiate contracts fits with 
other traditional concepts of the common law, such as the notion that 
failure to read a contract one has signed is no defense against the 
enforceability of the contract.47 That particular notion—about the 
importance of reading contracts—opened the door to a new concept of 
contract formation: contracts that could be enforceable without 
negotiation, even if consumers fail to read the terms at the time of 
formation. Sellers (and sophisticated buyers) began to ply contracting 
partners with boilerplate agreements, the terms of which are often 
unalterable, acontextual, and infrequently read. 
As an end result, most consumer contracts are non-negotiable. Terms 
may be accepted or rejected, but not shaped by the buyer. There may be 
consideration, but it is not bargained for. Consumer contracts governed 
by boilerplate terms have become the norm. More recently, this brave 
new world of boilerplate terms features a particularly pernicious 
specimen: the unilateral reordering clause, which purports to empower 
the seller to change the terms at any time, for any reason.48 
The movie excerpts described in Part I are thus more fiction than fact 
for a majority of American consumers. In this Part, we consider two 
other archetypes. The first comes from the fifth installment of George 
Lucas’s Star Wars space opera, The Empire Strikes Back.49 
In The Empire Strikes Back, a handful of heroes—the smuggler Han 
Solo; his sidekick, the Wookie Chewbacca; Princess Leia Organa; and 
the droid C-3PO—have sought aid from Lando Calrissian, one of Han’s 
old acquaintances. Lando is the administrator of a quasi-legal mining 
operation.50 What Han and the others realize too late is that Lando has 
47. As one court noted: 
To permit a party when sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny that it 
expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it 
or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. 
Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989). 
48. See infra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
49. STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980). 
50. In one scene, Lando describes his tenuous position: 
Lando: So you see, since we’re a small operation, we don’t fall into the, uh, jurisdiction of the 
Empire. 
Leia: So you’re part of the Mining Guild, then? 
Lando: No, not actually. Our operation is small enough not to be noticed. Which is 
advantageous for everybody since our customers are anxious to avoid attracting attention to 
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already struck a deal, betraying them to Darth Vader, heavy for the 
Galactic Empire and the ostensible villain of the piece. As Lando 
characterizes it just before the big reveal, the deal with Vader is 
designed to “keep the Empire out of here forever.”51 The initial 
negotiation is not fleshed out on screen, but viewers might reasonably 
imagine that Vader, as the number two man in the galactic Empire, used 
considerable bargaining power to secure certain concessions from 
Lando. Nevertheless, one could also imagine a dickered, if somewhat 
lopsided, bargain, upon which Lando might reasonably expect to rely. 
The viewer learns the rough outline of the deal as it changes over the 
last act of the film. First, Lando watches as Vader grants the bounty 
hunter, Boba Fett, permission to cart Han off to intergalactic mobster, 
Jabba the Hutt. Vader then informs Lando that Leia and Chewbacca 
“must never again leave this city.” 
Lando: That was never a condition of our agreement, nor was 
giving Han to this bounty hunter! 
Vader: Perhaps you think you’re being treated unfairly? 
Lando: [pauses, then nervously] No. 
Vader: Good. It would be unfortunate if I had to leave a 
garrison here. [Vader exits] 
Lando: [to himself] This deal is getting worse all the time!52 
Unfortunately for Lando, Vader is not yet finished reordering the deal. 
After Vader tests a carbon freezing unit on Han, and transfers the 
enslabbed smuggler to Boba Fett, he turns to Lando: 
Vader: Calrissian, take the princess and the Wookie to my ship. 
Lando: You said they’d be left in this city under my 
supervision! 
Vader: I am altering the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further.53 
themselves. 
Han: Aren’t you afraid the Empire’s going to find out about this little operation, shut you 
down? 
Lando: It’s always been a danger that looms like a shadow over everything we’ve built 
here . . . 
Id.  
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. The comedy program Robot Chicken spliced the two scenes to create the following 
running gag:  
Darth Vader: Leia and the Wookie must never again leave this city. 
Lando Calrissian: That was never a condition of our arrangement, nor was giving Han to this 
bounty hunter. 
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits] 
 
                                                     
 
12 - Linford Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:14 PM 
2013] UNILATERAL REORDERING IN THE REEL WORLD 1407 
While one is left to imagine exact details, it is clear enough that 
Lando thought he had a better deal when it was first formed.54 Lando’s 
indignation—assuming it is not feigned—suggests that he understood 
the concessions Vader secured from him in the initial negotiation were 
the only concessions required to keep his mining colony free of Imperial 
entanglements. 
These scenes from The Empire Strikes Back, while not directly about 
contract negotiation, match modern reality far better than those scenes 
presented in Part I. Take for instance the typical credit card agreement. 
The card provider typically claims authority pursuant to a unilateral 
reordering clause to change the deal as it sees fit after the fact. For 
example, in one dispute between Sears and customers who used a Sears 
credit card, the court upheld a change in a credit card policy for which 
the provider did not directly negotiate.55 The initial terms agreed to by 
consumers included a “Change of Terms” provision which claimed that 
Sears “has the right to change any term or part of this agreement, 
including the rate of Finance Charge, applicable to current and future 
balances.”56 When the customers signed on, there was no arbitration 
Lando: [to self] This deal’s getting worse all the time. [Vader enters] 
Vader: Furthermore, I wish you to wear this dress and bonnet. [Presents dress and bonnet to 
Lando] 
Lando: This was never a condition of our arrangement. 
Vader: [interrupts] I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits] 
Lando: [to self] This deal’s getting worse all the time. [Vader enters] 
Vader: Here is a unicycle. You will ride it wherever you go. [Presents unicycle to Lando] 
Lando: What? I’m not riding no [bleep]-ing unicycle. [Throws unicycle to the floor] 
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits] 
Lando: [to self, aggravated] This deal is getting worse all the time. [Vader enters] 
Vader: Also, you are to wear these clown shoes, and refer to yourself as “Mary.” [Presents 
clown shoes to Lando] 
Lando: [throws clown shoe] Oh, [shoe squeaks] you, man! I’m not doing it!  
Vader: I have altered the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further. [Vader exits] 
Lando: [to self] This deal . . . [pauses and looks around] is very fair and I’m happy to be a part 
of it. [Listens for Vader’s entrance. When Vader does not enter, Lando scoops up the dress, 
unicycle, and shoes, and exits screen left.] 
Robot Chicken: Star Wars Episode II (Stoopid Monkey television broadcast Nov. 16, 2008). 
54. One could instead read these scenes as highlighting the high cost of dealing with a corrupt 
government, or the lengths to which a businessman will go to circumvent government regulation. 
Ilya Somin, for example, has argued that this dialogue highlights the importance of the Contracts 
Clause of the Constitution. Ilya Somin, Darth Vader and the Contracts Clause, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/14/darth-vader-and-the-
contracts-clause/. 
55. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 887–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
56. Id. at 888. This Essay uses the term “unilateral reordering clause” instead of “change of terms 
clause” because there are cases where parties negotiate a change in the terms of a contract at arm’s 
length, and those changes can be recorded in a “Change of Terms Agreement.” See, e.g., Cranberry 
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clause. That soon changed. Sears sent out a letter to inform consumers of 
the new terms. While the cover letter did not flag particular changes, a 
copy of the new terms included an arbitration clause, requiring “[a]ny 
and all claims . . . be resolved . . . by final and binding arbitration before 
a single arbitrator.”57 The court enforced the new agreement, even 
though the consumers had not expressly agreed to it, and even though 
the services delivered by the credit card provider had not changed.58 In 
other words, the changes were enforced even though there was no 
bargaining and no consideration for the modification. 
There are cases in which new terms added to a credit card agreement 
have been held unenforceable because the agreement is 
“unconscionable”—grossly one-sided both procedurally and 
substantively.59 In many other cases, courts have upheld unilateral 
amendments made pursuant to unilateral reordering provisions in the 
original agreements against a claim of unconscionability because 
consumers have a right to opt out of the deal60—i.e., to immediately stop 
using the credit card rather than accept the change.61 The decision to 
keep using the card,62 or even the failure to cancel the credit card,63 has 
been taken as evidence of the consumer’s consent to the new terms. In 
The Empire Strikes Back, Lord Vader provided an opt-out of a sort to 
Fin., L.L.C. v. S & V P’ship, 927 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010); First Citizens Bank v. 
Sullivan, 200 P.3d 39, 41 (Mont. 2008). 
57. Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 889. 
58. Id. at 900. 
59. See, e.g., Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299 F. App’x 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2008). 
60. See, e.g., Joseph v. M.B.N.A. Am. Bank, N.A., 775 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that an amendment to a credit card agreement adding an arbitration provision was not 
unconscionable because plaintiff was given the right to opt out by terminating the agreement and the 
arbitration provision was not so one-sided as to be per se unconscionable); Herrington v. Union 
Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2000) aff’d sub nom. Herrington v. 
Union Planters Bank, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that consumers dissatisfied with a new 
arbitration clause “could have simply declined to accept the arbitration provision by terminating 
their account before the effective date of the amendment.”). 
61. Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 888. Some card providers do not require such an immediate 
decision. See, e.g., Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Walker, No. A117770, 2008 WL 4175125, at 
*5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. September 11, 2008) (holding an arbitration waiver was not unconscionable 
where consumers could refuse the new arbitration clause and continue using the card until its 
expiration). 
62. Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A.04–507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 
6, 2004) (denying enforcement of a new arbitration term on the ground that it was not contemplated 
in the original agreement, but noting that, “[i]f Plaintiffs had used their credit cards, they would 
have manifested their assent to the new term, and the change would no longer be unilateral.”). 
63. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boomer accepted this offer by 
continuing to use AT&T’s services, and therefore the CSA constitutes a contract.”).  
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Lando Calrissian, inviting him to modify the contract if he thought he 
was “being treated unfairly” and suggesting as part of the price of 
“opting out,” that Vader might have to leave a garrison of troops at the 
mining colony.64 
Unilateral reordering clauses are not upheld in every case. For 
example, one recent case was decided in favor of the consumer on 
appeal, but also poses a puzzle. In Douglas v. United States District 
Court,65 Talk America, a cellphone provider, attempted to enforce an 
arbitration clause that it unilaterally added to its terms of service. Talk 
America had not directly notified customers about the change, but 
posted the modified terms on its website. The Ninth Circuit granted a 
writ of mandamus, vacating the district court’s decision compelling 
arbitration.66 While the district court apparently assumed that Douglas 
must have visited Talk America’s website because he paid his bill 
online, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Douglas “would have had no 
reason to look at the contract posted there.”67 Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that Douglas was under no obligation to check for new terms, 
and had no way of knowing when to check for them.68 While the court 
recognized that assent can be implied in certain cases,69 it concluded that 
“such assent can only be inferred after [the consumer] received proper 
notice of the proposed changes.”70 Thus, the new terms were not 
enforceable.71 
Douglas is a puzzle not for its holding, but for seller behavior in its 
64. For reasons discussed below, courts likely overvalue the protection that an opt-out provides 
consumers. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
65. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2007). 
66. A writ of mandamus was necessary because the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16 
(2012), does not allow interlocutory appeals of a district court order compelling arbitration. 
67. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); First 
Citizens Bank v. Sullivan, 200 P.3d 39 (Mont. 2008); Cranberry Fin., L.L.C. v. S & V P’ship, 927 
N.E.2d 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
70. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066. 
71. The court in Douglas also noted the stringent unconscionability standards applied in 
California to arbitration clauses. Those standards may no longer be good law. To the extent that 
cases like Douglas are tied to the notable resistance of California state courts to unilateral shifts to 
arbitration, it is unclear whether those standards would survive direct scrutiny from the Supreme 
Court, particularly in light of its recent opinions broadening the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act. 
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted a state law barring enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver); see also Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court 
Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (2012). 
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aftermath. To date, no court has held that changes posted only to a 
website provide sufficient notice to consumers.72 Nevertheless, post-
Douglas, firms still include unilateral reordering clauses that promise 
nothing more than posting the new terms to a website. For example, the 
terms of service for cloud computing service Box.com claim the right to 
change the terms at any point, promising only to notify consumers “via 
the [Box.com] Service and/or by email,” and only if the company 
decides that the modification is “material.”73 As non-material changes 
could be posted to the www.box.com website or “related Box blogs,” 
customers are “encourage[d]” to “check the date of these Terms 
whenever [they] visit the Site to see if these Terms have been 
updated.”74 
Box.com is not the only company that persists in claiming that it can 
enforce new terms without providing direct notice to consumers.75 It is 
unclear why. Perhaps companies like Box.com have not processed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Douglas, or think that it will not be followed 
in other circuits or state courts.76 Perhaps they have decided to provide 
notice of any terms they hope to enforce, and are merely reserving a 
right that they will not attempt to exercise. Perhaps firms are becoming 
savvier about how to draft unilateral reordering clauses and how to 
frame consumer obligations. Firms might instead hope that encouraging 
72. Courts have upheld forum selection clauses in contracts between Google and users of its 
email services, because “Google requires all users, after seeing a screen listing the terms or a link to 
the terms, to agree to the terms of use before creating an email account.” Rudgayzer v. Google Inc., 
No. 13 CV 120(ILG)(RER), 2013 WL 6057988, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013). The court in 
Rudgayzer suggested that a unilateral reordering clause in the contract was enforceable, without 
discussing how consumers were put on notice of the change. Id. at *2 n.1. 
73. Box Terms of Service, BOX.COM, https://app.box.com/legal_text/tos (last updated Feb. 28, 
2013). 
74. Id. 
75. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last 
modified Mar. 1, 2012) (“We may modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a 
Service to, for example, reflect changes to the law or changes to our Services. You should look at 
the terms regularly. We’ll post notice of modifications to these terms on this page.”). Instagram’s 
terms of use instead: 
Reserve the right, in our sole discretion, to change these Terms of Use (“Updated Terms”) 
from time to time. Unless we make a change for legal or administrative reasons, we will 
provide reasonable advance notice before the Updated Terms become effective. You agree that 
we may notify you of the Updated Terms by posting them on the Service, and that your use of 
the Service after the effective date of the Updated Terms (or engaging in such other conduct as 
we may reasonably specify) constitutes your agreement to the Updated Terms. Therefore, you 
should review these Terms of Use and any Updated Terms before using the Service. 
Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM.COM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/# (last modified Jan. 19, 
2013). 
76. To date, none of the other circuits have cited the case in a reported opinion. 
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consumers to regularly check the website will convince courts that 
indirect notice is nevertheless sufficient notice.77 And perhaps 
companies take comfort in the fact that many courts and state 
legislatures seem more interested in policing the behavior of consumers 
than the behavior of credit card companies.78 
Considering the behavior of firms like Box.com, the contract-driven 
reel world interaction most representative of real world reordering 
played out in a recent episode of South Park.79 The conceit of the 
episode is that one of the characters, an elementary student named Kyle, 
never reads the updated terms governing his Apple products. In the 
process of clicking “yes” to an update, Kyle inadvertently agreed to 
undergo a medical experiment.80 He discovers his error when three 
“business casual G-Men” from Apple show up at a local restaurant to 
collect him: 
Apple Man 1: There he is! [The men approach him] Hello Kyle, 
we’re from Apple. We’re all ready for you now. [A second man 
sets a scale on the floor] 
Kyle: What? Ready for what? 
Apple Man 1: To fulfill the agreement. Can we get a weight 
please? [The third man puts Kyle on the scale] 
Apple Man 2: 83 pounds, sir. 
Kyle: What “agreement”?! 
Apple Man 1: 83 pounds, good. Let’s get the blood work. 
Kyle: Hey! You can’t do that! [The second man pulls out a tape 
measure to measure the circumference of Kyle’s head, while the 
third man produces a syringe and prepares to take Kyle’s blood] 
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
78. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 637–38 (2010) (describing 
how some states are engaged in a race to the bottom regarding consumer protections in order to 
attract the business of credit card providers); Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do 
What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1098, 1128–30 
(2010) (same); see also Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(“Delaware’s statutory scheme permitting unilateral amendment with an opt-out is an acceptable 
means of amending a credit card agreement.”). 
79. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD (Parker-Stone Studios television broadcast April 27, 2011). 
It will come as no surprise to the occasional viewer that the New York Times referred to the Comedy 
Central animated series as “willfully crude satire.” David Itzkoff, ‘South Park’ at 200: Trey Parker 
and Matt Stone Apologize to No One, ARTSBEAT.BLOGS.NYTIMES.COM, (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:30 
AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/south-park-at-200-trey-parker-and-matt-stone-
apologize-to-no-one/?_r=0. 
80. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD, supra note 79. Decency requires sparing the reader further 
details about the procedure to which Kyle unwittingly subjected himself. 
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Apple Man 1: You agreed we could take all the blood we 
needed. 
Kyle: What are you talking about?! 
Apple Man 1: When you downloaded the last iTunes update, a 
window on your screen popped up and asked you if you agreed 
to our terms and conditions. You clicked “Agree.” Alright, let’s 
get him to the water tank. 
Kyle: The water tank? [Steps off the scale and away from the 
men] Hey, I’m not going with you! 
Apple Man 1: You’ve agreed to all of this! [Kyle runs out of the 
restaurant] Hey!81 
Moments later, Kyle seeks help from his friends, who are incredulous 
that he never reads the terms and conditions: 
Kyle: You gotta help me. These business casual G-men are 
trying to kidnap me! 
Stan: What? 
Kyle: It’s crazy, dude! They’re saying it’s because I agreed to 
the latest terms and conditions on iTunes! 
Stan: Why? What did the terms and conditions for the last 
update say? 
Kyle: I don’t know, I didn’t read them! 
Butters: You didn’t read them? 
Kyle: Who the hell reads that entire thing every time it pops up? 
Stan: [earnestly] I do. 
Clyde: Me too. 
Kyle: You’re telling me that every time you guys download an 
update for iTunes, you read the entire terms and conditions? 
Jimmy: Of course. 
Butters: Well, how do you know if you agree to something if 
you don’t read it?82 
There is a level at which the satirists behind South Park are taking a 
dig at those who suggest consumers are overburdened and should not be 
required to read every online agreement to which they ostensibly 
agree.83 As one of the boys asks, “[h]ow do you know if you agree to 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual 
Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.–Feb. 2005, 26, at 26. 
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something if you don’t read it?”84 But even if we assume the average 
consumer has the capacity to understand the terms of every boilerplate 
contract, she would be hard-pressed to actually read them. Consider a 
recent study measuring the privacy policies posted on websites visited 
by the public (which are ostensibly enforceable from the moment the 
visitor logs on to the website).85 The study determined that the typical 
privacy policy on the typical site would take ten minutes to read,86 and 
the average American visits approximately 1,462 sites a year.87 Thus, the 
average consumer would need to spend thirty eight-hour days a year—a 
full month—reading privacy policies.88 The authors estimated the 
national opportunity costs of reading online privacy policies could reach 
$781 billion.89 That time estimate does not take into account changes to 
website terms. If every website changed policies once a year, that could 
double the time required.90 
It seems rather unlikely that a court would enforce a term in an iTunes 
update that allowed Apple to conduct a medical experiment on its 
customers.91 Reason might suggest that unilateral modification of iTunes 
contracts should be limited to things one might expect from iTunes, like 
data mining consumers’ music preferences, advertising new MP3s based 
on music they have purchased, or making prospective changes to pricing 
structures. For example, in Badie v. Bank of America,92 the court 
concluded that a bank could not add an arbitration clause to contracts 
with current customers, despite the inclusion of a unilateral reordering 
clause in the initial contract, because the initial contract had nothing to 
say about arbitration or a right to a jury trial.93 The court in Badie noted 
that “permitting the Bank to exercise its unilateral rights under the 
84. South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD, supra note 79 (emphasis added). 
85. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. 
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008). 
86. Id. at 554. 
87. Id. at 561. 
88. See id. at 563. 
89. Id. at 564. 
90. The study did not account for any terms of service or disclaimers for goods purchased. 
91. This is so in part because there is a higher bar to establish informed consent to medical 
procedures than in other contexts. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An 
Apologia 5 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 640, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255161.  
92. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
93. The court in Badie was also persuaded that “the notice contained in the bill stuffer” 
announcing the new arbitration clause “was ‘not designed to achieve knowing consent’ to the ADR 
provision.” Id. at 290 (quoting the trial court’s conclusion). 
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change of terms provision, without any limitation on the substantive 
nature of the change permitted, would open the door to a claim that the 
agreements are illusory.”94 Courts in other jurisdictions, however, reject 
the Badie rule. For example, in Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,95 an 
Illinois Appellate Court held that a unilateral reordering clause means 
what it says, and if the contract says anything can change, consumers 
should expect—and be bound by—changed language.96 The reality 
highlighted by The Empire Strikes Back and South Park is that most 
consumers are at the mercy of the seller, so long as they use the seller’s 
products or services, whether or not they realize that the deal has 
changed. 
III. THE INEFFICIENCY OF UNILATERAL REORDERING 
Unilateral reordering clauses would be impossible without a general 
acceptance of boilerplate in consumer and business-to-business 
transactions. It is hard to imagine, as the Darth Vader excerpt highlights, 
one party agreeing in an arm’s length transaction not only to whatever 
terms the other party articulates during negotiation, but also to whatever 
terms may suit that other party’s needs over the life of the contract,97 at 
least without significant concessions on other terms by the party that 
wants the unilateral reordering clause.98 
One of the common defenses of boilerplate on efficiency grounds is 
that it leads to lower prices.99 For example, in his opinion in IFC Credit 
94. Id. at 284–85, 297. For more on illusory agreements, which are generally held unenforceable, 
see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 150. 
95. 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
96. Id. at 900 (“[W]e do not read the ‘change of terms’ provision so narrowly as to preclude an 
amendment containing an arbitration provision.”). 
97. Based on a conversation with corporate counsel for a Fortune 500 company, when negotiating 
deals, boilerplate from the other side often includes a unilateral reordering clause, which the 
attorney instructs staff attorneys to strike out if they find it. 
98. But see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 636 
(2002) (proposing that in exchange for valuable consideration, one could choose to be bound to do 
any one thing the other party wrote and sealed in an envelope). In Barnett’s envelope hypothetical, 
one could imagine that the writing might require “Do any one thing I specify later.” The reader 
could intend to be bound to whatever the writer could later imagine, but the language might just as 
likely come as an unpleasant or even unfair surprise.  
99. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Terms and 
conditions offered by contract reflect private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of 
markets.”); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 
1318–19 (1981) (“Warranty exclusions are a form of product standardization . . . . [I]f the incidence 
or magnitude of an element of loss differs greatly between consumers of a product, the market for 
insurance may not be sufficiently large to justify offering insurance . . . . [Warranty exclusion thus 
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Corp. v. United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Union,100 Judge 
Easterbrook opined that terms in boilerplate contracts that 
overwhelmingly favor the seller invariably lead to savings for the buyer: 
If buyers prefer juries, then an agreement waiving a jury comes 
with a lower price to compensate buyers for the loss—though if 
bench trials reduce the cost of litigation, then sellers may be 
better off even at the lower price, for they may save more in 
legal expenses than they forego in receipts from customers.101 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical that savings from 
boilerplate clauses are passed on to consumers.102 Professor Margaret 
Radin suggests there is insufficient evidence for the traditional argument 
that consumers likely benefit to the tune of reduced prices when 
companies are allowed to restrict their duties and obligations using 
boilerplate.103 Professor David Horton goes farther, suggesting the 
presumption of consumer savings is at its core not falsifiable.104 In 
addition, the cost-saving argument ignores the cost of switching 
services, which is often the only opt-out available. When switching costs 
are high, firms can retain a greater proportion of a dissatisfied costumer 
base without passing on significant savings.105 
As noted above, courts sometimes find unilateral reordering clauses 
unconscionable, and thus unenforceable.106 But this presumption about 
pricing can have some problematic effects on standard unconscionability 
may reduce] the costs of production and distribution. In this respect, consumers of the product may 
be said to have demanded the exclusions.”). 
100. 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.). See also id. at 993 (“As long as the market is 
competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable; onerous terms just lead to lower 
prices.”). 
101. Id. at 993. In this way, Judge Easterbrook was simply following in the tracks of the 
assumptions articulated by Karl Llewellyn nearly a century ago, regarding the savings that come 
from standardized contract language: 
[Standardized forms] save trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining. They infinitely 
simplify the task of internal administration of a business unit, of keeping tabs on transactions, 
of knowing where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfillment, orderly 
planning. They ease administration by concentrating the need for discretion and decision in 
such personnel as can be trusted to be discreet. This reduces human wear and tear, it cheapens 
administration, it serves the ultimate consumer. 
K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939). 
102. See RADIN, supra note 2, at 100–09.  
103. Id. But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 15–16.  
104. Horton, supra note 78, at 647 n.274. (“[W]hether a market contains pro-drafter or pro-
adherent terms, the economic model concludes that it reflects adherents’ preferences.”). 
105. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (2004). 
106. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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tests. For example, in United States v. Bedford Associates,107 the Second 
Circuit articulated three factors to consider when determining whether a 
given clause is unconscionable: (1) the benefit of the bargain to the 
parties at the time of formation; (2) how the contract was negotiated; and 
(3) the relative bargaining power of the parties.108 If one assumes that 
terms unfavorable to consumers lead to a reduction in the price of goods 
and services, the first factor will always benefit the seller, because the 
benefit to consumers is assumed. Likewise, if one assumes that one-
sided “negotiations” always save consumers money, then concerns about 
actual negotiations are mitigated by the price reduction. Finally, a court 
willing to assume that unfavorable terms lead inexorably to favorable 
prices will see no need to concern itself with unequal bargaining power. 
Whatever its limitations, boilerplate is a fact of life in modern 
commercial culture, and it is unlikely to go away.109 Assuming arguendo 
that some of the economic justifications of boilerplate are nonetheless 
defensible, unilateral reordering clauses are much less defensible 
because they severely exacerbate the inefficiencies of boilerplate. The 
problems identified by behavioral economists regarding the challenges 
facing consumers who hope to comprehend or comparison shop when 
dealing with boilerplate are aggravated by unilateral reordering 
provisions. Even worse, there is some indication that the savings realized 
by sellers exercising a unilateral reordering provision are rarely, if ever, 
passed on to consumers post-formation. 
A. Unilateral Reordering Clauses Worsen Problems with Consent 
Boilerplate provisions have been challenged on the ground that 
consumers do not actually consent to them in any meaningful way. 
Unilateral reordering provisions exacerbate this problem. First, as 
described above, consumers could waste an inordinate amount of time 
simply trying to read all the boilerplate that suffuses their lives, and thus 
often do not bother.110 Unilateral reordering clauses compound the 
workload and further disincentivize reading. Second, unilateral 
reordering clauses reduce the effectiveness of consumer notice and even 
provide openings for sellers to attempt to evade consumer notice and 
107. 657 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982). 
108. Id. at 1312–13. 
109. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992–93 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting that courts almost always find boilerplate provisions 
enforceable). 
110. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
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hide potentially objectionable terms. 
As a matter of classic contract law doctrine, the party is bound to the 
terms of the contract, even if she did not read it.111 There is some sense 
in this. If we want to encourage consumers to read the contracts they 
sign (even boilerplate contracts),112 we would be ill-served to allow 
consumers to avoid clauses they did not read. But if a unilateral 
reordering clause is construed broadly, as it was in Hutcherson,113 there 
is no aspect of the contract immune to change from day to day. In such 
circumstances, it would be fruitless for the consumer to attempt to 
educate herself about the nuances of the contract. Thus, the unilateral 
reordering clause compounds the difficulty of comprehending the 
contract by requiring consumers to invest additional—and potentially 
futile—effort to understand every change. Some courts have thus limited 
change-of-terms clauses to ideas contemplated or at issue but unresolved 
in the original contract. Recall that in Badie v. Bank of America, the 
court concluded that a unilateral reordering clause did not empower a 
bank to add an arbitration clause to a credit card contract because the 
initial contract entered into by consumers did not discuss dispute 
resolution at all.114 Even with such a limiting construction, there is little 
benefit in trying to divine which changes a court might consider fair 
game and which changes are off-limits as not contemplated in the 
original contract. 
Some courts assume that a consumer who uses a product or service 
after contract terms are updated must be treated as though she consented 
to the new terms.115 Such an assumption seems defensible when the 
consumer is sufficiently notified of the change; but as the Douglas case 
demonstrates,116 notice is often insufficient.117 Even worse, change-of-
terms clauses are often held not to be unconscionable because consumers 
can opt out of the deal with the seller. In reaching that conclusion, courts 
often overlook the costs of consumer lock-in. For example, Oren Bar-
111. See supra note 47. 
112. There is some question whether it ever makes sense to read boilerplate, in light of the 
volume of information the typical consumer would need to digest. I leave that question for another 
day. But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 9–11. 
113. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 900 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003). 
114. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see also supra notes 92–94 and 
accompanying text. 
115. See, e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boomer accepted this 
offer by continuing to use AT&T’s services, and therefore the CSA constitutes a contract.”). 
116. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
117. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78, at 1136–37; Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty 
Promises, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 989 (2010); Horton, supra note 78, at 649–51, 662. 
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Gill has described how difficult it is for the typical consumer to correctly 
estimate the cost of switching to a new credit card once a six-month 
teaser rate on a credit card gives way to a higher rate.118 Other scholars 
have argued that credit card rates in general are set with one eye to the 
risk of providing credit to a particular consumer, and with the other to 
the opportunity presented by the “lock-in” effect.119 
There is a second fallacy underlying the assumption that consumer 
opt-out cures any distortions created by unilateral reordering. A 
unilateral reordering clause is only valuable in contracts where the seller 
and buyer will have a business relationship of more than a transitory 
duration.120 Presenting the consumer with an opt-out as the only 
corrective for a distorted deal strips away the consumer’s ability to plan 
long term in those situations where it is most essential.121 Shifting risk to 
the consumer post-negotiation hampers the ability of the consumer to 
plan for and account for risk. Enforcing unilateral reordering clauses 
empowers the company claiming the right to change terms and pass risk 
on to consumers without negotiating for that right up front, or even 
calculating that risk in the initial term. Here, the reel world can help us 
understand the disconnect between assumed ease of opt out and the 
unfortunate reality of unilateral reordering. Reflect back on the scenes 
from The Empire Strikes Back. Lando had an opt-out of a sort, which he 
finally exercised when the situation with Vader became intolerable: he 
shut down the mining operation, told his clientele to scatter, and shot his 
way out of the city with Princess Leia.122 It is not an outcome Lando 
might have embraced when the deal was first negotiated. 
B. Do Unilateral Reordering Clauses Save Consumers Money? 
As noted above, lock-in effects generally allow sellers to remain 
118. Bar-Gill, supra note 105, at 1407. 
119. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit 
Cards, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 339, 363–64. 
120. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78 at 1125: 
The power of the unilateral change-of-terms clause in continuing contractual relationships is in 
the dominant party’s ability to exercise the clause when the subordinate party is impotent to 
avoid the consequences of its operation. So it is in fact somewhat tautological to acknowledge 
the prejudice that operation of the clause entails: prejudice is the point. . . . As long as the 
dominant party maintains leverage, it does so precisely because that limited “remedy” is of no 
practical use to the subordinate party. 
121. See, e.g., Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., St. Unfair Trade Prac. L. (CCH) ¶ 31,169, 2006 WL 
6471430 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2006) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, whether in a few 
months or several years, the cardholder is left in the same position—either accept the arbitration 
clause or forfeit the ability to use a credit card.”). 
122. STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 49.  
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competitive, even if they pass on significantly less than the total savings 
generated by pro-seller contract provisions to consumers.123 Consumers 
have a difficult time properly pricing lock-in effects when change is 
flagged up front.124 It is more difficult when the terms can change with 
little advance notice and no limit on scope.125 Thinking back to the reel 
world examples from Part II, Darth Vader’s imperious approach differs 
stylistically from Apple’s automatic updates, but they lead to the same 
result—unexpected surprises for consumers for which it is difficult to 
plan. 
There is other evidence that the market for contract terms is typically 
not sensitive to reordering by consumers. First, there is some indication 
that even sophisticated attorneys tend to incorporate new clauses into 
boilerplate without fully understanding their import.126 Second, 
companies may not actually compete on boilerplate terms at all. To the 
extent that a clause provides an advantage to a seller (including 
managing risk), the rational competitor will incorporate that clause if 
they suspect that consumers do not shop based on contract terms.127 
These problems are exacerbated by unilateral reordering. In addition, 
boilerplate is often defended against claims regarding consumer consent 
and unfair pricing on the ground that sophisticated consumers will reject 
terms that are too objectionable, and there are enough sophisticated 
consumers to shape business practices.128 But adding a unilateral 
reordering clause to the mix disincentivizes sophisticated consumers and 
allows a seller to mitigate the impact of sophisticated consumers on its 
business practices. 
Even consumers who understand the general import of a unilateral 
reordering clause might misapprehend what they give up, especially 
when it is difficult to predict how a seller might reorder the contract, and 
what that might cost the consumer in the future.129 The flexibility 
provided by a unilateral reordering provision makes it likely that a firm 
will include one when drafting boilerplate. Finally, in some jurisdictions, 
123. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 118–19. 
125. See supra notes 82–96 and accompanying text. 
126. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 73–78 (2012). 
127. See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF 
MARKET CONTRACTS 106, 110 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) [hereinafter BOILERPLATE: MARKET 
CONTRACTS].  
128. See infra notes 133–35. 
129. Horton, supra note 78, at 652. 
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some businesses (most often credit card providers) can unilaterally 
reorder the contract even without reserving the right to do so in 
contractual language.130 In those jurisdictions, there will be no 
competition based on the presence or absence of a unilateral reordering 
clause because no clause is necessary. 
In addition, a seller exercising a unilateral reordering clause is less 
likely to pass savings on to consumers than in the general case, because 
the point of a change of terms clause is to shift risk and costs onto the 
contracting party once it is detected.131 Once consumers are locked in, 
the seller has a buffer against the need to make future concessions. As 
David Horton notes, businesses almost never offer a price reduction to 
consumers when the terms change.132 Even if one assumes that the 
product or service consumers purchase was properly priced to reflect the 
savings that consumers ostensibly secure through accepting or tolerating 
onerous boilerplate terms, the contract is almost never re-priced to 
reflect the saving that the seller supposedly passes on to consumers 
when it reorders the contract. 
Professor Douglas Baird has suggested that despite these typical 
concerns, we may not need to worry about contracts of adhesion and 
boilerplate, at least so long as there are some sophisticated consumers 
that will understand the terms and shop with their feet.133 The 
sophisticated consumer is a false hope for several reasons, and the 
problem is once again exacerbated by unilateral reordering clauses. First, 
firms have become more adept at dealing with the sophisticated 
consumer differently than the general populace. Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk and Judge Richard Posner have argued that businesses are less 
likely to behave opportunistically than consumers, so the ability to set up 
130. Id. at 625 n.132.  
131. As noted by Horton:  
[T]he absurdity of the “opt out” period comes into sharp relief when one considers that the 
adherent would be leaving a company over the existence or non-existence of a procedural term 
for another company that enjoys the unfettered power to add, delete, or modify its own 
procedural terms. With no way to be sure that the new firm will continue to use the same 
procedural provisions in the future, a rational adherent would stay put. 
Id. at 650–51. 
132. Id. at 651 (noting one exception, Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 
1413 (M.D. Ala. 1998), where consumers were given the option to accept a unilaterally added 
arbitration clause in exchange for a reduction of two percent to the interest rate charged). 
133. Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, in BOILERPLATE: MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note 
127, at 131, 134. Baird thus acknowledges that in markets which typically lack sophisticated 
consumers—like the market for rent-to-own furniture at issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture, Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)—courts should take a more serious look at the 
enforceability of the substantive terms of the contract, rather than assume the contract is shaped in 
part by the ability of sophisticated consumers to opt out. Id. at 138. 
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rigid, business-protective rules in boilerplate language is the most 
efficient option because the firm is likely to relax those rules for 
consumers who do not behave opportunistically.134 What Professor 
Bebchuk and Judge Posner describe as a benefit becomes a detriment 
when one realizes that sellers can use the same bright line to forestall the 
claims of the unsophisticated consumer while preserving the flexibility 
to treat sophisticated consumers better. A happy sophisticated consumer 
is less likely to warn her unsophisticated fellows. Thus, the corporation 
can avoid the need to change the terms of the contract by buying off the 
sophisticated consumer whose departure might otherwise provide a 
warning like the proverbial canary in the coal mine.135 
Another problem posed by relying on the sophisticated consumer is 
that even when sophisticated consumers bring problems to the attention 
of the public, the public’s collective attention span is unfortunately 
short.136 A seller can play a long game, making substantive shifts in its 
favor over time while creating the impression that the company is 
conceding on major points. One need only look at the history of privacy 
disputes by Facebook users to see this process play out.137 As early as 
2006, Facebook began changing its privacy policy in ways that triggered 
strong objections from consumers.138 Facebook responded with 
occasional retrenchments and invitations to consumers to adjust privacy 
settings, but the combination of Facebook’s nudges towards full 
disclosure and its incremental changes in its default settings continually 
ratchets down baseline privacy expectations regarding access to user 
information.139 This occurs despite frequent updates by well-informed 
134. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer 
Markets, in BOILERPLATE: MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note 127, at 3, 9–10.  
135. Sometimes, the company gets rid of difficult consumers instead. See, e.g., Sprint disconnects 
customers who complain too much, USA TODAY (July 10, 2007, 7:59 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-07-09-sprint-disconnects-customers_n.htm 
(describing how Sprint Nextel cut service for 1,000 consumers who averaged forty to fifty calls per 
month to customer service). 
136. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Speech and Progress Institutions, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 56–57) (describing the public outcry against recent copyright 
reform bills). 
137. See generally Robert E. Lemons, Protecting Our Digital Walls: Regulating the Privacy 
Policy Changes Made by Social Networking Websites, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 603 
(2011); Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/12/business/facebook-privacy.html?_r=0);  
Matt McKeon, The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook, http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/ 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
138. See e.g., Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Grapples with Privacy Issues, WALL ST. J., May 
19, 2010, http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704912004575252723109845. 
139. See McKeon, supra note 137. 
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users who successfully ferret out every shift in Facebook’s terms of 
service.140 
C. The End of Unilateral Reordering? 
What then should be done? The ship has sailed regarding the 
enforceability of boilerplate,141 but in light of the manner in which 
unilateral reordering clauses exacerbate problems with consumer 
consent and the illusion that products with onerous terms always have 
pro-consumer pricing, the correct policy response may be a prophylactic 
rule barring any changes enacted pursuant to a unilateral reordering 
clause offered in boilerplate language.142 Such a prophylactic rule is 
bound to be over-inclusive.143 For example, in some cases, well-
informed consumers might legitimately prefer to accept a unilateral 
reordering clause. It is also possible that some consumers who fail to 
consider, or are incapable of fully processing the import of a unilateral 
reordering clause, might nonetheless prefer it to other alternatives 
because the lowest price is the only salient factor in the decision 
regarding which among competing products to purchase or services to 
use.144 But the harms stemming from allowing unilateral reordering 
clauses are sufficiently severe for the majority of consumers specifically, 
to markets generally, and to any reasonable theory of contract law, that 
the losses from applying a prophylactic rule are far outweighed by the 
benefits that will stem from such a rule. 
For those skeptical of the prophylactic rule, consider two alternatives: 
a “two-price” solution designed to help consumers properly price the 
140. See e.g., Steve Henn, Facebook’s Latest Privacy Changes: Tag, You’re You, NPR, (August 
30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/30/217281470/facebooks-latest-
privacy-changes-tag-youre-you. 
141. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992–93 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.). 
142. As noted by Professors Bar-Gill and Davis, Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board under the Truth in Lending Act, bans creditors from changing terms in a home 
equity plan. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5b(f)(3) (2013); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 117, at 31. Other 
authors have taken more limited stances against unilateral reordering clauses. Professors Peter Alces 
and Michael Greenfield have argued that under traditional contract doctrines, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and certain statutes, some unilateral reordering clauses would be unenforceable. 
See generally Alces & Greenfield, supra note 78. Professor Horton supports his call for a bar on the 
ability of drafters to unilaterally reorder procedural terms like arbitration clauses by noting that 
consumers are unlikely to benefit from the change, or even recognize the importance of new 
procedural clauses as changes occur. See Horton, supra note 78, at 652. 
143. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 397 (1985) (describing the 
over- and under-inclusiveness of the rule-like definition of commercial speech). 
144. Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 11. 
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unilateral reordering option at the time of purchase,145 and a “perceived 
value” proposal designed to ensure that sellers are passing some savings 
on to consumers when exercising a unilateral reordering clause.146 As for 
the first, Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis argue that the 
unilateral reordering problem can be corrected by inserting a third party 
into the contract, one that will determine whether any given attempted 
reordering is enforceable.147 These third-party “Change Approval 
Boards” could market themselves based on how strictly they construe 
unilateral reordering clauses. 
In a way, Professors Bar-Gill and Davis have suggested a complicated 
means of ensuring a level of transparent pricing. Thus, a simpler solution 
presents itself: require the seller who offers its goods or services subject 
to a unilateral reordering clause to also offer the same goods or services 
without such a clause. The goods or services sold subject to seller 
reordering are likely to be cheaper than those sold under less alterable 
deals. This two-price solution would be similar to other circumstances 
where consumers can purchase what are ostensibly the same goods or 
services, but with different contract terms and therefore different price 
points. For example, Professor Omri Ben-Shahar has recently reminded 
us that more people buy nonrefundable, economy-priced airline tickets 
than more flexible first-class or business-class tickets, trading flexibility 
for price.148 The difference in price is transparent, at least on some 
websites, where the economy class ticket is often steeply discounted 
compared to first-class or flexible tickets.149 Like the difference between 
economy and business class airline tickets, a two-price solution to the 
unilateral reordering problem would be a minor improvement compared 
to the status quo because it would require purveyors of unilateral 
reordering terms to transparently price the difference. 
The downside of the two-price solution is readily apparent. The 
requirement would likely increase costs for sellers, because it would lead 
to non-uniform treatment of consumers purchasing the same products 
and services. Those costs will almost certainly be passed on to 
145. See infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra notes 152–60 and accompanying text. 
147. Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 117, at 991. 
148. Some have argued that first and business-class tickets were historically over-priced, due to a 
lack of sensitivity to price on the part of business travelers in the 1980s. See, e.g., Jon Bonné, Inside 
the Mysteries of Airline Fares, NBC NEWS.COM (May 8, 2003), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3073548/ns/business-us_business/t/inside-mysteries-airline-fares/#. 
UfvYjdK1FCg. 
149. This has been the author’s experience purchasing tickets on the Delta.com website. 
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consumers who prefer the certainty of a deal to one that can be 
subsequently reordered. There is also a chance that sellers will try to 
take unfair advantage of consumers who favor predictability over 
surprises, and price the “plain vanilla” contract like retailers price 
insurance for electronics—offering too little coverage for too much 
money,150 while hoping to take advantage of consumers’ cognitive 
limitations.151 Nonetheless, if consumers were offered two options, (1) a 
cheaper “Darth Vader” deal, where the seller reserves the right to change 
the terms, and (2) a more expensive contract that could not be changed 
without something resembling a bargained-for exchange, the seller 
would at least send a clear signal about the level of contractual 
predictability offered to the purchaser of its product or service. 
If one is concerned that forcing sellers to offer two deals takes away 
too much necessary discretion, and is still persuaded that cost savings 
realized through unilateral reordering could be passed down to 
consumers, a second option—the “perceptible value” proposal—offers 
the seller the opportunity to put its money where its clause is. In one 
reported case, Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc.,152 a credit card 
provider attempted to keep consumers from exercising the ability to opt 
out of a new arbitration clause by promising a 2% cut in the interest rate 
for those who agreed to binding arbitration.153 The court reasonably 
found the modification enforceable because consumers accepting the 
modification were given an actual, perceptible benefit for doing so, and 
consumers who did not accept the modification were allowed to keep 
using the card in accordance with the old deal.154 It is not unreasonable 
to think that the card provider valued its savings under the arbitration 
clause at something above the 2% cut. Neither is it irrational to think that 
even consumers who valued the ability to sue a credit card company for 
breach of contract might have been willing to trade it away in exchange 
for a 2% rate cut. 
150. Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, draft at 18. 
151. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995). 
152. 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
153. The terms of the credit card agreement stated that: 
You may elect to reject these changes in terms by completing the attached postage paid 
postcard and returning it to American General Financial Center postmarked no later than 
March 1, 1997. If you reject these changes your Annual Percentage Rate(s) will be reinstated to 
the current rate(s) disclosed on your enclosed billing statement, and there will be no arbitration 
agreement in effect. 
Id. at 1413. 
154. Id. at 1417–18. 
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Following the example in Stiles, a change made pursuant to a 
unilateral reordering clause might be enforceable if the party making the 
change—almost always the seller155—gives something of value to the 
party subject to the change. Unlike the two-price solution,156 which 
provides clarity ex ante to consumers regarding the value to the seller of 
the right to unilaterally reorder the contract, the perceptible value 
proposal would maintain some seller flexibility up front, but require 
sellers to reify the assumption underlying standard economic defenses of 
boilerplate that contracting efficiencies will trickle down to consumers. 
Thus, for example, a unilateral change to Facebook’s privacy policy 
might be enforceable under the perceptible value proposal if Facebook 
users subject to the change were provided with free promotion of a post 
or two.157 
The perceptible value proposal would not require sellers to pass all 
savings on to consumers. In line with old notions of sufficient 
consideration, something just north of a negligible benefit could 
suffice.158 But like the benefit offered in Stiles, the benefit conveyed 
should be some form of cash or savings that lasts for the remainder of 
the existing term of the contract. For example, it would not meet the goal 
of the perceptible value proposal to conclude that consumers received 
something of value from a seller who adds an arbitration clause to a 
contract simply because the seller is bound to arbitration like 
consumers.159 In addition, the perceptible value proposal would not 
necessarily require sellers to provide an opt-out to consumers, which is 
155. But see Andrew Trotman, Man Who Created Own Credit Card Sues Bank for Not Sticking to 
Terms, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personal 
finance/borrowing/creditcards/10231556/Man-who-created-own-credit-card-sues-bank-for-not-
sticking-to-terms.html (reporting that a Russian court upheld new terms inserted by a consumer in a 
credit card agreement when the bank signed the modified agreement, apparently without reading it). 
156. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
157. The going rate to promote one of the author’s Facebook posts on September 13, 2013 was 
$6.99, a price that is, for now, too rich for the author to pay. Facebook claims that promoting a post 
“simply increases the likelihood that your audience will see your message in their News Feed.” 
Promoted Posts, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/promote (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
How much promotion increases said likelihood has not been disclosed.  
158. In fact, courts are unlikely to wade into the question of whether value conveyed by the seller 
is commensurate with the change made. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 
445 (N.Y. 1982) (“Far from consideration needing to be coextensive or even proportionate, the 
value or measurability of the thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as it is acceptable to 
the promisee.”). 
159. But see In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2002) (holding a new arbitration 
clause in an employment contract enforceable because “the promise to arbitrate would have been 
binding and enforceable on both parties”). 
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of questionable value in any case.160 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed prophylactic rule barring the enforceability of unilateral 
reordering clauses in boilerplate contracts,161 and the more limited two-
price and perceived value proposals,162 would lead in the same 
direction—toward something reminiscent of old requirements for 
bargained-for exchange to support an enforceable contract 
modification.163 Some might find the proposals too strong, but at a 
minimum, there is good reason to question whether standard economic 
defenses of boilerplate are applicable to unilateral reordering clauses. 
The public may be required to live with boilerplate, but perhaps they 
should not be subject to the endless reordering of that boilerplate, like 
some game of musical chairs that only the seller can win. As the reel 
world catches up to modern reality, may there seldom be cause to say 
about our contractual obligations, “this deal is getting worse all the 
time.” 
160. While the contract in Stiles also included an opt-out provision, the ability to opt out is hardly 
the sine qua non of an enforceable modification in a contract of adhesion, particularly in light of the 
difficulties presented by calculating lock-in effects. See supra notes 104–05, 121 and accompanying 
text. 
161. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 147–60 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra Part I.B.  
 
                                                     
